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Abstract: We consider a monopolistic firm producing a good while polluting and 
using a fossil energy. This firm can adopt a clean technology by incurring an 
investment cost decreasing exponentially with the adoption date. This clean 
technology does not pollute and has a lower production cost because it uses a 
renewable energy. We determine the optimal adoption date for the firm in the case 
where it is not regulated at all, and in the case where it is regulated at each period of 
time i.e. the regulator looks for static social optimality. Interestingly, the regulated 
firm adopts the clean technology earlier than what is socially-optimal. However, the 
non-regulated firm adopts later than what is socially-optimal. The regulator can 
induce the firm to adopt at the socially-optimal date by a postpone adoption subsidy. 
Nevertheless, the regulator may be interested in the earlier adoption of the firm to 
encourage the diffusion of the use of clean technologies in other industries.  
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1. Introduction 
 
We consider a monopolistic firm producing a good using a polluting technology. 
This can be the case of a producer of electricity like société tunisienne d’éléctricité et 
du gaz (STEG) which has the monopoly power of producing and distributing 
electricity in Tunisia. This polluting production uses fossil energy. The firm can 
adopt a clean technology within a finite time by incurring an investment cost 
decreasing exponentially as the adoption is delayed. The clean production 
technology is characterized by no pollution emission and a lower production cost 
because it uses a renewable energy (e.g. solar energy). We consider the case where 
the firm is not regulated. We also consider the case where the firm is regulated at 
each period of time by an emission-tax when it uses the polluting technology; when 
the firm uses the clean production technology, it receives a per-unit production 
subsidy that can be considered as a fiscal incentive. In the latter case, the regulator 
looks for static social optimality.  
Interestingly, the regulated firm adopts the clean technology in a finite time and 
earlier than what is socially-optimal. Therefore, in a dynamic setting, instantaneous 
regulation, which is socially-optimal, may not be dynamically optimal with respect 
to the adoption of clean technologies. The regulator can compensate the firm for the 
losses incurred when it accepts to delay its adoption to the socially-optimal adoption 
date. We also show that the non-regulated firm adopts the clean technology in a 
finite time but later than what is socially-optimal.  
Indeed, when the regulated firm switches to the clean technology, it no longer pays 
a pollution tax, receives a production subsidy and its production cost decreases. 
Consequently, its instantaneous net profit increases importantly and that’s why it 
adopts the clean technology very soon. In the same time, the instantaneous social 
welfare level increases because there are no environmental damages and production 
costs are lower. However, this last increase is less important than that of the 
instantaneous net profit of the regulated firm. For this reason the regulated firm 
adopts the clean technology earlier than what is socially-optimal. When the non-
regulated firm adopts the clean technology, its production cost decreases. 
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Consequently, its instantaneous net profit increases, but not importantly, and less 
than the increase of the social welfare. For this reason, the adoption date of the non-
regulated firm is later than what is socially-optimal. 
This work can be placed in the international context where encouraging the use of 
renewable energies, such as solar energy or wind energy, in place of fossil energy is 
one of the most stimulating debates of the recent years. Indeed, countries are more 
conscious that fossil energy is becoming scarce and they are now experiencing the 
harmful effects of climate change. Moreover, petrol multinationals have gained too 
much money in the last decade and are now ready to invest in the promotion of 
renewable energies. 
Dosi and Moretto (1997) studied the regulation of a firm which can switch to a 
clean technology by incurring an irreversible investment cost. This technological 
switch is expected to provide benefits surrounded, however, by a certain degree of 
uncertainty. To bridge the gap between the private and the policy-maker’s desired 
timing of innovation, they recommended that the regulator stimulate the innovation 
by subsidies and by reducing the uncertainty surrounding the profitability of the 
clean technology through appropriate announcements. Dosi and Moretto (2010) 
extended the previous study to an oligopolistic industry and studied the incentives 
of not being the first firm adopting the clean technology.  
Soest (2005) analyzed the impact of environmental taxes and quotas on the timing 
of adoption when the date at which improved energy-efficient technologies become 
available is uncertain, and when the investment decision is irreversible. He found 
that neither policy instrument is unambiguously preferred to the other. Nasiri and 
Zaccour (2009) proposed a game-theoretic approach to model and analyze the 
process of utilizing biomass for power generation. They considered three players: 
distributor, facility developer, and participating farmer. They characterized the 
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and discussed its features. Ben Youssef (2010) 
considered a monopolistic firm that can adopt a cleaner technology within a finite 
time by incurring an investment cost. It has been shown that the socially-optimal 
adoption date of incomplete information is delayed compared to that of complete 
information.  
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Wirl and Withagen (2000) considered a model where a clean technology is 
available and requires costly investments but is characterized by low variable costs 
(e.g., solar energy or wind power). They showed that, in a competitive equilibrium, 
pollution-control policy is not necessarily optimal in the sense of leading to the social 
optimum. Fischer, Withagen and Toman (2004) developed a model of a uniform 
good that can be produced by either a polluting or a clean technology. This latter is 
more expensive and requires investment in capacity. They showed that the optimal 
transition path is quite different with a clean or dirty initial environment.  
Some empirical studies have been interested in clean technologies. Whitehead and 
Cherry (2007) estimated the annual benefits of the regional amenities associated with 
a green energy program in North Carolina. Varun, Prakash and Bhat (2009) found 
that wind and small hydro are the most sustainable sources for the electricity 
generation. Li et al. (2009) estimated how much US households would be willing to 
pay annually to support increased energy R&D activities designed to replace fossil 
fuels. Caspary (2009) assessed the likely competitiveness of different forms of 
renewable energy in Colombia over the next 25 years. Pillai and Banerjee (2009) 
reviewed the status and potential of different renewable energies (except biomass) in 
India and established a diffusion model as a basis for setting targets.  
The most important feature of the present work is that the clean technology has a 
lower production cost than the polluting technology. Moreover, we compare the 
socially-optimal adoption date and the optimal adoption date of the instantaneous 
regulated and non-regulated firm. Theses comparisons have not been reported by 
previous studies. One important question to which we try to respond is whether the 
regulator should intervene in the adoption of clean technologies by firms, and how? 
Our main results are in contrast with the findings of Ben Youssef (2010) who 
showed that, because of the positive marginal social cost of public funds, the 
instantaneous net profit of the regulated firm is nil and, consequently, the firm never 
adopts the cleaner technology unless it receives an innovation subsidy. Also, in Dosi 
and Moretto (1997) study, the regulator objective is the abandonment of the polluting 
technology and the adoption of the green one before a ‘’critical’’ date, whereas in the 
present paper the regulator maximizes his intertemporal social welfare function for 
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the determination of the socially-optimal adoption date. Moreover, these authors 
have not considered the case where the firm is instantaneously regulated. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 
studies the non-regulated firm case. Section 4 studies the instantaneous regulated 
firm case. In Section 5, we derive the optimal adoption dates and we compare them. 
Section 6 concludes and an Appendix contains some proofs.  
 
2. The model 
 
We consider a monopolistic firm producing a good in quantity q sold on the 
market at price p(q)=a-bq, a,b>0. 
The consumption of this good gives a consumers’ surplus equal to 
2
0 2
)()()( qbqqpdzzpqCS q =−= ∫ . 
At the beginning i.e. at date 0, the firm uses a polluting production technology 
using fossil fuels and characterized by a positive emission/output ratio e>0. 
Therefore, the pollution emitted by the firm is E=eq, which causes environmental 
damages equal to D=αE, where α>0 is the marginal disutility of pollution. Let us 
point out here that we suppose that damages caused to the environment are due to 
the flow of emissions and not to the stock of pollution. 
With the polluting technology, the unit production cost is d>0 and the profit of the 
firm1 is dqqqpd −=Π )( . 
The firm behaves for an infinite horizon of time and can adopt a clean production 
technology within a period of time τ. This clean technology does not pollute at all, 
uses a renewable energy (solar energy for instance) and therefore has a lower unit 
production cost c verifying 0<c<d. Thus, the profit of the firm is .)( cqqqpc −=Π
 
An investment cost is necessary to get the clean technology. This investment cost 
could comprise the R&D cost or the cost of acquisition and installation of the clean 
technology.  
                                                          
1 In what follows, the subscripts d and c refer to the polluting and clean technologies, respectively.  
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The investment cost of adopting the clean technology at date τ actualized at date 0 
is: 
τθτ mreV −=)( ,                                                              (1) 
where θ>0 is the cost of immediate adoption of the clean technology, r>0 is the 
discount rate, and the parameter m denotes that the investment cost of adoption 
decreases more rapidly when it is greater. We suppose that m>1. 2 
Function V is decreasing because of the existence of freely-available scientific 
research enabling the firm to reduce the investment cost of adopting the clean 
technology when it delays its adoption, and is convex because the adoption cost 
increases more rapidly when the firm tries to accelerate the adoption date. Let’s 
remark that τ=+∞ means that the firm never adopts the clean technology. 
 
3. Non-regulated firm 
 
In this section, we will study the case where, at each period of time, the monopoly 
is not regulated even when it uses the polluting technology. 
When it uses the polluting technology, the firm maximizes its profit dΠ  to get the 
optimal level of production: 3 
b
daq nd 2
−
=                                                              (2) 
When it uses the clean technology, the firm maximizes its profit cΠ  to get the 
optimal level of production: 
b
caq nc 2
−
=                                                             (3) 
Because of condition (6), 0>ndq
 
and 0>ncq . 
It is easy to verify that the firm produces more with the clean technology because 
of its lower production cost ( )ndnc qq > . 
 
                                                          
2
 The restriction m>1 is necessary for the optimal adoption dates to be positive. Also, it guarantees the 
second-order condition when determining the optimal adoption dates (see the Appendix).  
3 The superscript n refers to the non-regulation case.   
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4. Regulated firm 
 
In this section, we study the case where the firm is regulated at each period of time. 
Rather than directly looking to the socially-optimal regulatory instruments, we will 
determine the socially-optimal production quantities. Next, we determine the 
regulatory instruments. Thus, we have a leader-follower relationship where the 
regulator is a leader and the monopoly is a follower. 
When the firm uses the polluting technology, the instantaneous social welfare is 
equal to the consumers’ surplus, minus damages plus the profit of the firm: 
)()()( qqDqCSS dd Π+−=                                                   (4) 
Maximizing the expression given by (4) with respect to q gives the socially-optimal 
production level with the polluting technology: 
b
edaqd
α−−
=ˆ                                                              (5) 
We assume the following condition so that production quantities are positive: 
eda α+>                                                                (6) 
Therefore, the maximum willingness to pay for the good must be higher than the 
marginal cost of production plus the marginal damage of production. 
Since the firm is a polluting monopoly, it is regulated. An emission-tax per-unit of 
pollution λ  is sufficient to induce the socially-optimal level of production. 
Indeed, the instantaneous net profit of the firm is: 
)()( qEqU dd λ−Π=                                                       (7) 
The socially-optimal per-unit emission-tax that induces the firm to produce dqˆ  is: 
e
qbda dˆ2−−
=λ                                                          (8) 
Using the expression of dqˆ  given by (5), we can show that: 
eda αλ 20 <−⇔>                                                     (9) 
Therefore, the emission-tax is positive when the marginal damage of production is 
high enough. Otherwise, it is negative meaning that the regulator subsidizes 
production to deal with the monopoly distortion.  
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When the firm uses the clean technology, the instantaneous social welfare is equal 
to the consumers’ surplus plus the profit of the firm: 
)()( qqCSS cc Π+=                                                     (10) 
Maximizing the expression given by (10) with respect to q gives the socially-
optimal production level with the clean technology: 
0ˆ >−=
b
caqc                                                           (11) 
It is easy to verify that dc qq ˆˆ > . Therefore, the clean technology enables to produce 
more and without pollution.  
We can establish that: 
edaqq ndd α2ˆ >−⇔>                                                (12) 
Indeed, with the polluting technology, the socially-optimal production takes into 
account both environmental damages and monopoly distortion. That’s why it is 
higher than the optimal level of production for the non-regulated firm only when the 
marginal damage of production is low enough. However, with the clean technology, 
there is no pollution, and we always have ncc qq >ˆ  as it is commonly known.  
Since the production process is clean, the regulator gives the firm a subsidy s for 
each unit produced, which can be considered as a fiscal incentive. One may think 
about production of electricity. A per-unit production subsidy can be given by the 
regulator when the production process is clean (using solar energy, for instance).  
This per-unit subsidy is chosen so that it induces the socially-optimal level of 
production. 4 
Indeed, the instantaneous net profit of the firm is: 
sqqU cc +Π= )(                                                       (13) 
The socially-optimal per-unit subsidy that induces the firm to produce cqˆ  is: 
                                                          
4
 Note that, in expressions (4) and (10), taxes and subsidies don’t appear because they are pure 
transfers from the firm to the regulator. Indeed, we suppose that there is no marginal social-cost of 
public funds and no transaction costs: the tax diminished from the firm’s profit is added to the 
consumers’ welfare, and the subsidy added to the firm’s profit is diminished from the consumers’ 
welfare.  
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acqbs c −+= ˆ2                                                       (14) 
Using the expression of cqˆ given by (11), we can show that s>0. 
In the Appendix, we show that: 
)ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()()(0 ddccddccnddncc qUqUqSqSqq −<−<Π−Π<
                   
(15) 
The above inequalities enable us to establish the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. The instantaneous gain from using the clean technology is greater for the 
regulated firm than for the regulator. This latter instantaneously benefits more from the clean 
technology than the non-regulated firm.  
 
Indeed, when the regulated firm adopts the clean technology, it no longer pays a 
pollution tax, receives a production subsidy and its unit production cost decreases. 
This increases its instantaneous net profit significantly. The instantaneous social 
welfare level increases because of the absence of environmental damages and the 
lower production costs. However, this last increase is less important than that of the 
regulated firm. The unique benefit of the non-regulated firm from adopting the clean 
technology is the reduction of its unit production cost. Consequently, its 
instantaneous net profit increase is less important than that of the instantaneous 
social welfare. 
 
5. Optimal adoption dates 
 
 The intertemporal payoffs, of the regulator or the firm, are equal to the 
instantaneous payoffs actualized at date zero minus the investment cost of adopting 
the clean technology at date M. Therefore, the intertemporal social welfare, 
intertemporal net profits of the regulated firm and non-regulated firm are, 
respectively: 
τ
τ
τ
θτ mrrtccrtdd edteqSdteqSIS −
+∞
−−
−+= ∫∫ )ˆ()ˆ()( 0                               (16) 
τ
τ
τ
θτ mrrtccrtdd edteqUdteqUIU −
+∞
−−
−+= ∫∫ )ˆ()ˆ()( 0                             (17) 
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τ
τ
τ
θτ mrrtnccrtnddn edteqdteqIU −
+∞
−−
−Π+Π= ∫∫ )()()( 0                          (18) 
In order to have positive adoption dates, we need the following condition, which 
can be always verified by choosing the parameters θ and/or m high enough: 5  
mrqUqU ddcc θ<− )ˆ()ˆ(                                                      (19) 
The regulator or the firm maximizes its intertemporal payoff function with respect 
to τ to get the optimal adoption date. In the Appendix, we determine the socially-
optimal adoption date, the optimal adoption dates for the regulated and non-
regulated firm, which are respectively: 
0)ˆ()ˆ(ln)1(
1
ˆ >




 −
−
=
mr
qSqS
rm
ddcc
θ
τ
                                        
  (20) 
0)ˆ()ˆ(ln)1(
1* >




 −
−
=
mr
qUqU
rm
ddcc
θ
τ
                                        (21)                                            
0
)()(
ln)1(
1* >







 Π−Π
−
=
mr
qq
rm
n
dd
n
ccn
θ
τ
                                      (22)  
 
Proposition 2. We have the following ranking for the optimal adoption dates: 
**
ˆ0 nτττ <<<                                                             (23) 
Therefore, the optimal adoption date for the regulated firm is earlier than the socially-optimal 
adoption date, which is earlier than the optimal adoption date for the non-regulated firm. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
The above results show that socially-optimal instantaneous regulation may not be 
dynamically optimal with respect to the adoption of clean technologies. They are due 
to the fact that the incentives to adopt are, in order, greater for the regulated firm, the 
regulator and the non-regulated firm. This is clearly established by the inequalities in 
(15).  
Paradoxically, if the regulator desires that the regulated firm delays its adoption to 
the socially-optimal adoption date, he must compensate the firm for the losses it 
incurs by this adoption delay. If we consider our previous example where the firm is 
                                                          
5 Notice that the left expression of (19) is independent of parameters θ,  m and r.   
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given a subsidy for each unit of electricity produced with the clean technology using 
solar energy; one important reason for the very early adoption by the regulated firm 
is the per-unit production subsidy received from the regulator; this engenders 
important investment cost of adoption for the intertemporal social welfare; to 
overcome this, we propose that the regulator gives a postpone adoption subsidy to 
the firm.  
If the intertemporal net profits of the regulated firm are )( *τIU and )ˆ(τIU when the 
adoption dates are *τ  and τˆ , respectively, then the postpone adoption subsidy 
(compensation) is: 
0)ˆ()( * >−= ττ IUIUg                                                       (24) 
 
Proposition 3. The regulator can push the regulated firm to delay its adoption of the clean 
technology by giving it a postpone adoption subsidy that compensates the firm for the losses it 
incurs when the latter delays its optimal adoption date to the socially-optimal adoption date. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we consider a monopolistic firm producing a good using a polluting 
technology. However, this firm can adopt a clean technology within a finite time by 
incurring an investment cost decreasing exponentially as the adoption is delayed. 
The clean production technology is characterized by no pollution emission and by a 
lower production cost because it uses a renewable energy. We consider the case 
where the firm is not regulated. We also consider the case where the firm is regulated 
at each period of time by an emission-tax when it uses the polluting technology, and 
by a production subsidy when it uses the clean one. The regulator maximizes the 
instantaneous social welfare.  
When the regulated firm switches to the clean technology, it no longer pays a 
pollution tax, receives a production subsidy and its unit production cost decreases. 
Consequently, its instantaneous net profit increases significantly. The instantaneous 
social welfare level increases because of the absence of environmental damages and 
the lower production costs. However, this instantaneous benefit of social welfare 
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from the clean technology is less important than that of the firm. When the non-
regulated firm adopts the clean technology, its unit production cost decreases. 
Consequently, its instantaneous net profit increases, but not importantly, and less 
than the increase of the instantaneous social welfare. These results induce the 
following. 
The non-regulated firm adopts the clean technology in a finite time but later than 
what is socially-optimal. Interestingly, the regulated firm adopts the clean 
technology in a finite time and earlier than what is socially-optimal. The regulator 
can compensate the firm for the losses incurred if he desires that the firm delays its 
adoption to the socially-optimal adoption date. However, the regulator may be 
interested by allowing the firm to adopt earlier to encourage the diffusion of the use 
of clean technologies in other industries.  
 
Appendix 
 
A) Instantaneous gains from the clean technology 
*From expressions (4) and (10), we have: 
dddccdddcc qeqcdqqcqq
b
aqSqS ˆˆ)()ˆˆ()ˆˆ(
2
)ˆ()ˆ( α+−+−



−+−=−  
By using the expressions of dqˆ  and cqˆ given by (5) and (11), the above bracketed 
expression is equal to .
2
ecd α+−
 Therefore, we have: 
 0)ˆˆ(
2
)ˆ()ˆ( >++−=− dcddcc qq
ecdqSqS α                                       (25) 
*From expressions (7) and (13), we have:  
[ ] ddcdcdcddcc qeqdqcsqqqqbaqUqU ˆˆˆ)()ˆˆ()ˆˆ()ˆ()ˆ( λ++−+−+−=−  
By changing the emission tax λ and the production subsidy s by their expressions in 
function of dqˆ   and cqˆ given by (8) and (14), we obtain: 
0)ˆˆ()ˆ()ˆ( 22 >−=− dcddcc qqbqUqU                                               (26) 
*We can easily show that: 
[ ] ncndndncndncnddncc cqdqqqqqbaqq −+−+−=Π−Π )()()()(  
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By replacing ncq  and 
n
dq  between the above brackets by their values given by (2) and 
(3), we get: 
0)(
2
)()( >+−=Π−Π ndncnddncc qq
cdqq
                                (27)
 
Therefore, the clean technology improves the instantaneous social welfare when 
production levels are socially-optimal. It also increases the instantaneous net profit of 
both regulated and non-regulated firm. 
 
B) Comparison of the instantaneous gains 
*By using expressions (25) and (26), we have: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dcdcddccddcc qqecdqqbqSqSqUqU ˆˆ2ˆˆ)ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆ( +


 +−
−−=−−−
α
 
By using the expressions of dqˆ  and cqˆ , given by (5) and (11), in the above bracketed 
expression, we obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0ˆˆ
2
)ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆ( >++−=−−− dcddccddcc qq
ecdqSqSqUqU α
               (28)
 
*By using expressions (25) and (27), we get: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
[ ] ( )dcndncdc
n
d
n
cdc
n
dd
n
ccddcc
qqeqqqqcd
qqcdqqecdqqqSqS
ˆˆ
2
ˆˆ
2
2
ˆˆ
2
)()()ˆ()ˆ(
++−−+
−
=
+
−
−+
+−
=Π−Π−−
α
α
 
By replacing ndq , ,
n
cq dqˆ  and ,ˆcq  in the above brackets by their values, given by (2), 
(3), (5) and (11), we obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( )dcnddnccddcc qqeb edcacdqqqSqS ˆˆ22 222)()()ˆ()ˆ( ++ −−−−=Π−Π−− αα  
Using condition (6) for the above bracketed term gives: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0ˆˆ
24
)()()()ˆ()ˆ(
2
>++
−
>Π−Π−− dc
n
dd
n
ccddcc qq
e
b
cdqqqSqS α
              (29) 
Thus, we have the following ranking: 
)ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()()(0 ddccddccnddncc qUqUqSqSqq −<−<Π−Π<
                   
(30) 
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The instantaneous gain from using the clean technology is greater for the regulated 
firm than for the regulator, which benefits from the clean technology more than the 
non-regulated firm.  
 
C) Optimal adoption dates 
*To get the socially-optimal adoption date, the regulator maximizes his 
intertemporal social welfare function given by (16) with respect to τ: 
( ) 0)ˆ()ˆ( =+−=
∂
∂
−− ττ θ
τ
mrr
ccdd mreeqSqS
IS
                                 (31) 
Equation (31) is equivalent to: 
⇔=+− − 0)ˆ()ˆ( )1( τθ rmccdd mreqSqS 




 −
−
=
mr
qSqS
rm
ddcc
θ
τ
)ˆ()ˆ(ln)1(
1
ˆ                 (32) 
Because of m>1, condition (19) and inequality (30), 0ˆ >τ . 
We have: ( ) ττ θ
τ
mrr
ddcc emreqSqSr
IS
−−
−−=
∂
∂ 2
2
2
)()ˆ()ˆ( . 
Using the first-order condition given by (31), we get: 
0)1()ˆ( ˆ22
2
<−=
∂
∂
− τθ
τ
τ mrermm
IS
 
The second-order condition of optimality is verified. 
*The regulated firm maximizes its intertemporal net profit given by (17) with respect 
to τ: 
( ) 0)ˆ()ˆ( =+−=
∂
∂
−− ττ θ
τ
mrr
ccdd mreeqUqU
IU
                                 (33) 
Equation (33) is equivalent to: 
⇔=+− − 0)ˆ()ˆ( )1( τθ rmccdd mreqUqU 




 −
−
=
mr
qUqU
rm
ddcc
θ
τ
)ˆ()ˆ(ln)1(
1*              (34) 
Because of m>1 and inequality (19), 0* >τ . 
We have: ( ) ττ θ
τ
mrr
ddcc emreqUqUr
IU
−−
−−=
∂
∂ 2
2
2
)()ˆ()ˆ( . 
Using the first-order condition given by (33), we obtain: 
0)1()( *22
*2
<−=
∂
∂
− τθ
τ
τ mrermm
IU
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Therefore, the second-order condition of optimality is verified. 
*The non-regulated firm maximizes its intertemporal net profit given by (18) with 
respect to τ: 
( ) 0)()( =+Π−Π=
∂
∂
−− ττ θ
τ
mrrn
cc
n
dd
n
mreeqqIU                                  (35) 
The above equality implies: 
⇔=+Π−Π − 0)()( )1( τθ rmnccndd mreqq 






 Π−Π
−
=
mr
qq
rm
n
dd
n
ccn
θ
τ
)()(
ln)1(
1*           (36) 
Because of m>1, inequalities (19) and (30), 0* >nτ . 
We have: ( ) ττ θ
τ
mrrn
dd
n
cc
n
emreqqrIU −− −Π−Π=
∂
∂ 2
2
2
)()()( . 
Using the first-order condition given by (35), we obtain: 
0)1()( *22
*2
<−=
∂
∂
−
n
mr
nn
ermm
IU τθ
τ
τ
 
The second-order condition of optimality is verified. 
 
D) Comparison of the optimal adoption dates 
Inequalities (30) and the assumption m>1, enable us to make the following ranking: 
**
ˆ0 nτττ <<<  
The regulated firm adopts sooner than what is socially-optimal, whereas the non-
regulated firm adopts later. 
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